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A Prolegomenon to the Study of Racial Ideology  
in the Era of International Human Rights   
Justin Desautels-Stein
ABSTRACT
There is no critical race approach to international law.  There are Third World approaches, 
feminist approaches, economic approaches, and constitutional approaches, but notably 
absent in the catalogue is a distinct view of international law that takes its point of departure 
from the vantage of Critical Race Theory (CRT), or anything like it.  Through a study of racial 
ideology in the history of international legal thought, this Article offers the beginnings of an 
explanation for how this lack of attention to race and racism came to be, and why it matters today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International law is a strange business, and perhaps it has always been so.  As 
a field of governance meant to restrict the wills of emperors, kings, and presidents, 
what was once called jus gentium surely boasts an unusual job description.  Of 
course, it is this very quality that likely accounts for both the field’s eternal 
popularity, as well as its perennial opprobrium.  But here in the first decades of the 
twenty-first century, we might inquire about what is so especially strange about 
international law in the present moment.  After all, since the postwar inauguration 
of the United Nations (UN), the functions of international law are now routine, if 
still questionably effective.  What is strange about our current international legal 
order lies not in its fundamental purpose, or in its (in)ability to realize its aims.  The 
issue is this: There is a hole in the fabric of international law, and very few have 
noticed. 
To get a sense for this absence, consider Andrea Bianchi’s International Law 
Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking.  The book provides a recent 
survey of what is and is not going on in the intensely eclectic world of 
international legal thought.1  In his tour of what it means to think like an 
international lawyer today, the scene includes no less than thirteen distinctive 
modes, including Law and Economics, Marxism, Feminism, and Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).2  As the study attests, there is a lot 
going on in the contemporary analysis of international law.  What is not going on 
in international legal thought, however, is the study of race.  This silence was 
flagged twenty years ago in a symposium organized by the Villanova Law Review, 
titled “Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and 
Divergence.”3  In the introduction to the symposium, Ruth Gordon wrote, 
 
1. ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT WAYS OF 
THINKING (2016). 
2. See generally id.  
3. Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 
VILL. L. REV. 827 (2000).  A sample of representative writings that have emerged in the last two 
decades since the symposium include ADOM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2019); JOHN REYNOLDS, EMPIRE, EMERGENCY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017); HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); MOHAMMAD SHAHABUDDIN, ETHNICITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORIES, POLITICS, AND PRACTICES (2016); E. Tendayi Achiume, 
Beyond Prejudice: Structural Xenophobic Discrimination Against Refugees, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
323 (2014); Robert Knox, Valuing Race?  Stretchead Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism, 4 
LONDON REV. INT’L L. 81 (2016); Celina Romany & Joon-Beom Chu, Affirmative Action in 
International Human Rights Law: A Critical Perspective of its Normative Assumptions, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 831 (2004); Kim Benita Vera, From Papal Bull to Racial Rule: Indians of the 
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“Traditional international discourse is framed in terms of formal equality, and race 
appears to be an almost nonexistent factor.  International legal theory rarely 
mentions race, much less employs it as a basis of analysis.”4 
Gordon’s assessment is unfortunately as relevant today as it was then.  
Especially when we consider the flowering of international legal scholarship that 
has taken place in the last two decades along with the rising popularity of 
international law as a profession, the absence of race on Bianchi’s and many others’ 
lists is all the more puzzling.  This silence is odd, not only because of the glaring 
mismatch between a form of social dislocation that is only getting worse and a 
global legal regime the interests of which remain elsewhere.  The situation is 
strange because the failure to grapple with racism and xenophobia is not 
accidental.  This hole in the global legal order is no oversight, it is not because of a 
lack of resources, it is not because of a lack of enforcement power, and it is not 
because of a lack of will.  Or, at least, it is not only because of these things. Our 
obliviousness about international law’s silence is a result of an ideology of 
inclusion.  And if that is right, a strange game is afoot. 
But before getting to that, we should ask, is it correct to claim that 
international law rarely mentions race?5  After all, the vulgar racism of the 
nineteenth century was eventually displaced in the move to international 
institutions that began with the League of Nations and the minority treaty system, 
and which then developed into the United Nations and international human 
rights law.  With figures like Julian Huxley heading the newly formed United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and 
Ashley Montagu leading UNESCO’s “statements on race” project, along with the 
UN General Assembly’s adoption of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the middle decades of the 
twentieth century gave international law an explicit and intentional rejoinder to 
 
Americas, Race, and the Foundations of International Law, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 453 (2012); and 
Adrien Katherine Wing, Global Critical Race Feminism: A Perspective on Gender, War, and 
Peace in the Age of the War on Terror, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007).  
4. Gordon, supra note 3, at 829–30 (emphasis added). 
5. In this Article I do not have the space to take up the fascinating question of whether the Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement does, in fact, provide a racial 
approach to international law, and I simply take it as a given here that TWAIL and a critical 
race approach to international law are meaningfully different things.  At the level of 
international institutions, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
shouldered the task since the middle of the twentieth century.  Today, the most prominent 
agencies within that Office tasked with combating racism in international law are the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Special Rapporteur 
on Contemporary Forms of Racism. 
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nineteenth century racism.6  After the U.S. civil rights movement went 
mainstream and South African apartheid finally collapsed, the global response to 
racism seemed triumphant.  To be sure, even on the mainstream view there was 
work still to be done.  In 1993, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
established a Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, in 2001 a 
world conference against racism was held in South Africa, and the international 
machinery of administration and conferences continue to churn today. 
My claim in this Article is that while it is certainly true that for more than a 
century international lawyers have wrestled with the problem of racial prejudice 
and the ability to craft international laws and institutions that might respond to 
and regulate that racism, what has been very rarely addressed is the way in which 
international legal thought is itself constituted by a structure of racial ideology.7  
On this view, race and racism are not merely objects of legal regulation.  Rather, 
these concepts perform as modes of justification essential to the liberal 
construction of the entire system.8  My claim therefore depends upon a distinction 
between racism as a form of individual prejudice and anomalous behavior on the 
one side, and racism as a structure of racial ideology on the other.  
 
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL BANTON, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF RACE (2002); PATRICK 
THORNBERRY, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (2016). 
7. This Article anticipates a much more extensive analysis in my forthcoming book, THE RULE OF 
RACIAL IDEOLOGY: A GLOBAL CRITIQUE OF LAW, BORDERS, AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
(forthcoming with Oxford University Press). For a discussion of ideology and law, see Justin 
Desautels-Stein & Akbar Rasulov, Deep Cuts: Four Critiques of Legal Ideology, 31 YALE J.L. & 
HUM. 435 (2021). 
8. For a sample of the literature on critical race theory, see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM 
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS 
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Celebrating Critical Race 
Theory at 20, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1497 (2009); Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”:  Race, 
Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007); and Athena D. Mutua, 
The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 
84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (2006).  I do not want to be misunderstood for suggesting that racism 
necessarily trumps other forms of discrimination in international law.  Rather, the claim is that 
racism garners far less attention than sexism or economic development in international law.  
With respect to the reality of an intersectional pattern of worldwide discrimination, see, for 
example, PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (2d ed. 2000); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND 
CLASS (1983); AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Sex and Class: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER 
OUTSIDER 114 (rev. ed. 2007); Sumi Cho et al., Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: 
Theory, Applications, and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785 (2013); Kelly Coogan-Gehr, The Politics of Race 
in U.S. Feminist Scholarship: An Archaeology, 37 SIGNS 83 (2011); and Rebecca L. Clark Mane, 
Transmuting Grammars of Whiteness in Third-Wave Feminism: Interrogating Postrace 
Histories, Postmodern Abstraction, and the Proliferation of Difference in Third-Wave Texts, 38 
SIGNS 71 (2012). 
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With respect to the study of racial ideology in international law, since the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century and in the context of liberal political 
theory, there have been three primary structures of racial ideology: classic, 
modern, and postracial.  The classic structure of racial ideology was singularly 
focused on the production of raciality and the justification of exclusion.  One 
might presume that international lawyers in the nineteenth century had little 
difficulty in excluding certain peoples from the realm of sovereignty.  Exclusion, 
after all, was hardly a new idea.9  For millennia, it was typical to separate the 
barbarians from the zoon politikon.  For even longer there have been characteristic 
efforts to distinguish various peoples from one another on the basis of religion, and 
before that, surely, there was “us” and “them.”  After the introduction of liberal 
theory, however, these old maneuvers for excluding outsiders from insiders were, 
simply put, illiberal.  Religion proved too blunt of a tool for distinguishing 
analytically between the “civilized” and “uncivilized.”  To be sure, a prominent and 
recurring proxy for what counted as “civilized” was whether a sovereign was 
Christian.  As a mode of legal argument, however, references to religious authority 
inevitably came into conflict with the liberal view of the rights-bearing individual 
on which the new understanding of the sovereign was based. 
It was precisely at the same time that international lawyers were seeking legal 
justifications to exclude large portions of the world from the rights of sovereignty 
that the science of racial classifications was exploding throughout the Western 
world.  First invented in the late seventeenth century and slowly evolved over the 
course of the eighteenth, it was in the nineteenth century that raciality emerged as 
a reliable piece of empirical science.  Of course, this science of race was racist.10  
Configured like a set of concentric circles, at the center of the target belonged the 
most developed human beings, those peoples descended from the Caucasus 
region between the Black and Caspian seas.  One step out were those Aryan 
relatives of the proto-Indo-European peoples that had migrated out to Spain, 
India, and Persia.  Next were the American Indians and “Mongoloid” peoples, and 
finally were those descendants from the African continent.  Each circle designated 
 
9. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY (2010); MICHAEL BURLEIGH, 
EARTHLY POWERS: THE CLASH OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN EUROPE FROM THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION TO THE GREAT WAR (2005); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF 
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–960 (2001); JENNIFER PITTS, A 
TURN TO EMPIRE: THE RISE OF IMPERIAL LIBERALISM IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (2006). 
10. See BRUCE BAUM, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CAUCASIAN RACE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF RACIAL 
IDENTITY 95–118 (2006); IVAN HANNAFORD, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN THE WEST 
(1996).  For the legal context of these concepts, see Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal 
Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2012). 
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a degree of intellectual, cultural, and spiritual achievement, starting with the 
greatest achievements at the center and moving out accordingly.11 
This hierarchy of racial classification became the model for what 
international lawyers coined “the Family of Nations.”12  With respect to its 
ideological structure—if not the reality of practice—at the center of the system 
were the Great Powers.  Next came those middle and small European powers, all 
of whom enjoyed sovereign rights.  Eventually the United States and the 
“liberated” colonies of South America would join as well.  The Persians, the 
Ottomans, the Chinese, and Japanese existed in a semi-peripheral, quasi-civilized 
outer circle beyond the borders of the Family of Nations.13  Africa existed further 
out still.  The ability to provide legal justifications for excluding much of the non-
European world was of great importance to the Great Powers: If a people could 
claim sovereignty, they claimed the equal rights of civilization, of liberalism, 
including rights of nonintervention and self-determination.  What’s more, these 
legal justifications needed to be liberal in and of themselves.  After all, the hierarchy 
of racial classification was no piece of ancient foolishness.  It was new and 
grounded in natural science.  As a legal justification for the exclusion of peoples 
from the Family of Nations, the science of racial classification was perfect. 
In contrast, the modern structure of racial ideology emerged in the course of 
the twentieth century with the following characteristics.  First, there was a 
weakening of the argument that theories of racial development could justify the 
sovereign’s right to exclude other peoples from the Family of Nations, that 
international community of rights-bearing peoples.  Whereas in classic racial 
ideology, race proved an international legal justification for exclusion, in the 
modern form a more functional view of international society suggested the need 
to be more inclusive.  And in many important ways, the new international 
institutions of the twentieth century did become, very slowly, more inclusive.  
Second, modern racial ideology’s more catholic approach to international society 
was underwritten by a shifting of the racialized right to exclude to the borders 
between national communities.  Whereas there had earlier been a far more laissez-
faire approach to border controls, by the early decades of the twentieth century 
sovereigns were relying on a new form of race science to justify the exclusion of 
undesirable people at the border.  This was a moment in which international law 
 
11. See NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE HISTORY OF WHITE PEOPLE (2010); NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA OF 
RACE IN SCIENCE: GREAT BRITAIN 1800–1960 (1982).  
12. For an overview of the “Family of Nations,” see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–12, 
31–35 (2d ed. 1912). 
13. See ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
1842–1933 (2014). 
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might have moved the question of migration to the foreground of its disciplinary 
machinery, but instead, the problem of constituting boundaries was deposited in 
the background space of the right to exclude.  Reinforcing this view of 
international law’s limited appetite for antiracist regulation, the effort to promote 
racial equality as an international ideal eventually diminished into an 
individualized mode of antidiscrimination law.  By the 1970s, the international 
responsibility for racial equality was becoming the sole province of human rights. 
Between World War II and the 1970s, international law’s association with the 
antidiscrimination principle was not as markedly individualist as we think of it 
today.  For even while the antidiscrimination principle was being developed in the 
early iterations of the UN’s International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) and on the administrative machinery of its Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), it was also pressed into the 
service of the decolonization movement.  But after decolonization peaked in 
efforts like the project for a New International Economic Order, the 
antidiscrimination principle shifted entirely into the familiar space of 
international human rights law.  Once understood as also a fixture of 
decolonization’s social justice program, the antidiscrimination principle soon 
reemerged in the individual rights regime.  The problem of raciality generative of 
peoples, and of racial discrimination waged against peoples, was morphing into a 
problem of individual prejudice.  Consequently, and for the most part, the concept 
of antidiscrimination detached itself from the anticolonial mission and enrolled in 
the newly energized international human rights movement. 
This intellectual alliance between the generalized prohibition on racial 
discrimination and international human rights law is a crucial feature of the 
contemporary morph from modern to postracial ideology.  It is here that we come 
to see the hallmark of international law’s current race problem: by the time the use 
of racial classifications merged with the “neutrality” of the antidiscrimination 
principle, and work on the physical anthropology of race became increasingly 
nebulous, cultural disagreement emerged as a primary focus of international legal 
scholarship and practice. Racism and xenophobia dropped out of the 
conversation, and now running riot at the border, lie in a blind spot, secluded from 
international law’s field of vision.  It is in this double foregrounding of 
multiculturalism and its discontents on the one side, and the hegemony of the 
antidiscrimination principle on the other, that the challenges of racism and 
xenophobia slide into international law’s background.  It is because of this double 
maneuver that we often fail to see how the shift from the Family of Nations to the 
United Nations did not delete the racially exclusionary practices of the nineteenth 
century as much as it cut and pasted them at a different kind of borderland.  It was 
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here that a new ideology of inclusion busily worked its way up above, distracting 
from a new ideology of exclusion, digging in below. 
Why does this view of racial ideology in international law remain so 
obscured?  The answer is implicated in the development of a third and 
contemporary phase of racial ideology, a postracial ideology which mystifies the 
contemporary manifestation of the sovereign’s right to exclude.  On the other side, 
there is ideological justification for a contemporary vision of the right to exclude.  
Postracial ideology shoulders both tasks: mystification and justification.   
The purpose of this Article is to help explain the ideological preconditions for 
postracial ideology in international law, but not the postracial structure itself.  That 
is, this Article lays out a prologue to the story of racial ideology in our own era of 
international human rights law.  In doing so, the Article begins with some 
comments on methods of analysis.  As I have said, the target in this inquiry is racial 
ideology, and as I explain in Part I, I understand racial ideology as a legal 
ideology—that is, as a mode of naturalizing juridical science.  My aim is not to tell 
an intellectual or social history of international law.  I do not mean to suggest that the 
concept of race or racial ideology is somehow the key variable that can explain 
everything.  My aim is more technical, which is to understand the racialized structure 
of an ideological form of legal justification.  Part I both clarifies the purpose of this 
methodological approach, and hopefully avoids some misunderstandings about 
what it is not.  Part II turns to the classic mode of racial ideology in international law.  
It looks to the international lawyer and U.S. statesman Elihu Root as exemplary of 
its operation.  The defining feature of the classic mode is its use as a mediating 
device: As international lawyers and politicians assumed the classic liberal view of 
sovereigns as free, equal, and independent, the question was how to justify the 
frontiers of the community of rights-bearing sovereigns.  Racial ideology 
shouldered that task.  Part III explores the mistaken premises of this conventional 
narrative and explains why today’s lack of a racial approach to international law is 
no accident.  As the twentieth century began, nineteenth century fascinations with 
phrenology and bloodline were slowly giving way to new advances in 
anthropology, and the old science of racial classification was weakening.  As a 
result, many international lawyers argued for a retreat from the old Family of 
Nations model, and a move forward toward an international law of racial equality.  
In international legal thought, what emerged by the 1920s is what I call a modern 
structure of racial ideology.  On the one hand, racial discrimination was becoming 
slowly disfavored at the level of international society.  Rather than exclude 
nonwhite peoples from the new international institutions, international law was 
taking baby steps in its new embrace of an ideology of inclusion.  All peoples were 
believed to enjoy the right of international participation, eventually.  On the other 
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hand, this ideology of inclusion at the level of international institutions drew 
attention away from a new ideology of exclusion digging in at the level of territorial 
borders.  While nineteenth century international law had largely abided by a 
laissez-faire approach to migration, the League of Nations formed a new 
international law of territorial exclusion that was entrenched by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and Congress.  This right to exclude individual people at the territorial 
border, memorialized in the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, became the gold 
standard for sovereigns around the globe.  Under the influence of a burgeoning 
eugenics movement, this right to exclude individual people from domestic society 
was decisively racial—and was the twentieth century update to the nineteenth 
century’s right to exclude peoples from international society. 
This is the great bait and switch: While a racial ideology of exclusion was 
slowly giving way at the level of international institutions, it was reimagined at the 
level of territorial borders and a regime of racialized migration governance.  The 
consequences of the displacement of a racialized right to exclude from the Family 
of Nations to the sovereign border have been dramatic.  Despite the fact that 
support for the so-called plenary power to exclude migrants was drawn from 
international law, and that the sovereign’s contemporary right to exclude is an 
international rule, the very idea of racism in international law has gone right out 
of sight.  The reasons are many, but chief among them is the mainstream view 
that racism does not exist as a structure of racial ideology, but instead exists as 
acts of individual discrimination.  And if racial discrimination is the problem, 
human rights law is the answer.  But this view of discrimination neither 
understands the scope of today’s right to exclude, nor the racial ideology that 
continues to sustain it. 
Until we can better understand what became of international law’s classic 
mode of racial ideology, and how it morphed into a modern structure, we will 
continue to see international law’s race problem as entirely marginal—a problem 
that does not really infect the discipline as much as it does individual agents.  The 
twenty-first-century transition into a postracial ideology is bad news: more 
disastrous than the moderns, and more deceptive than the classics.  At the same 
time, the sovereign right to exclude seems more powerful than ever.  In the first 
decades of the twenty-first century, a generalized fear of foreigners—and 
foreignness—is spinning out of control.  At the least, here in the wake of a Trump 
Administration run amok and a Biden Administration struggling at the border, 
the sovereign right to exclude foreigners that was born in the crucible of modern 
racial ideology appears revitalized.  What’s more, the right of certain peoples to 
exclude other peoples from the community of rights-bearing sovereigns looks to 
be on the rise.  To be sure, there is nothing yet that suggests the coming arrival of a 
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new Congress of Vienna, with its explicit forms of legal hierarchy.  And yet, this is 
precisely what certain thinkers in the United States have recently been advocating 
for in the context of the so-called War on Terror: While so-called great powers like 
the United States ought to enjoy the full rights of sovereignty, peoples either 
“unable” or “unwilling” to conduct themselves “rationally” on the world stage 
should not.14  Startlingly, the sovereign’s right to exclude—both at the level of 
territorial border control and at the level of sovereign-sovereign relations—is 
more active than it has ever been in international legal history.  If international 
human rights law is the answer, so be it.  But let it be reimagined. 
I. ON METHOD 
While largely understudied, race has substantially influenced international 
legal thought.  Of course, this influence has been intensely diverse, and might be 
analyzed in any number of arenas.15  In this Article, my focus is on the use of race 
as a structure of argumentative practice, with race serving a powerfully 
harmonizing purpose in the context of liberal legal thought.16  In brief, liberal 
legalism begins in a contest with its Aristotelian predecessor, articulating a 
baseline thesis of individual right against the Aristotelian theory of intelligible 
essences.17  But this thesis of individual right cannot stand alone.  It requires 
political management, thus triggering a second liberal commitment to political 
order.  The problem in securing this form of order, however, is the persistent 
question of equality.  In the effort to tame the thesis of individual right, no one 
group could naturally profit at the expense of another.  The solution to this 
problem is a third thesis in the language of liberal legal thought: the rule of law—or 
naturalizing juridical science.18 
In the classic From Apology to Utopia, Martti Koskenniemi outlined this 
precise problem at the level of international legal thought, in which the demands 
 
14. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, POINT OF ATTACK: PREVENTIVE WAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL 
WELFARE (2014). 
15. For recent works, see, for example, EMPIRE, RACE, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (Duncan Bell ed., 2019), 
and CAROLA LINGAAS, THE CONCEPT OF RACE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2020). 
16. My use of “structure of argumentative practice” draws heavily upon JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN, 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF STYLE: A STRUCTURALIST HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND 
LIBERAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2018), and Justin Desautels-Stein, International Legal Structuralism: A 
Primer, 8 INT’L THEORY 201 (2016). 
17. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (1975). 
18. DESAUTELS-STEIN, supra note 16, at 10 (“In the context of liberal legal thought, naturalizing 
juridical science holds that legislation is political and discretionary, that adjudication is 
impersonal and constraining, and that in order to maintain this distinction, the work of 
adjudication must prove a natural harmony between the imperatives of the first two theses.”). 
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of freedom, order, and the rule of law recur.19  In this illustration of international 
critical legal studies, Koskenniemi suggested that the legal concept of sovereignty 
is stuck in a paradox if one only considers the conflicting demands of freedom and 
order.  To move past it, international lawyers harmonize the dissonance by way of 
a process of intellectual mediation, namely a state’s tacit consent to the rule of law.  
For instance, State A will argue against State B that it deserves the freedom to act in 
furtherance of its self-preservation and that it is beholden to no rules to which it 
has not given its consent.  State B will argue against State A that if there is to be any 
kind of meaningful international order, certain rules must constrain all sovereigns 
in the choices that they make.  These two claims about freedom and order—what 
Koskenniemi calls ascending and descending patterns of argument—are mutually 
exclusive so long as the whole structure is founded on an underlying premise of 
sovereign equality: thus, the contradiction.  The way to harmonize this apparent 
tension between the demands of freedom and order is to suggest State A’s tacit 
consent to the rule of law.  Strictly speaking, and wholly in the abstract, this is a 
nonracialized form of naturalizing juridical science. 
I mention Koskenniemi’s important work in From Apology to Utopia in 
order to distinguish a structure of argumentative practice in which equality 
predominates from a structure of argumentative practice in which it does not.  
Under Koskenniemi’s framework, the drive toward a mediating device like tacit 
consent is motivated by the indispensable requirement that sovereigns consent to 
the rules by which they are governed.  Modifying consent so that it speaks at once 
to the contrasting theses of freedom and order gives the appearance of harmony.  
And this modification is the trick explored throughout From Apology to Utopia.  
But the present question is not about how to harmonize the conflict between the 
theses of freedom and order.  It is rather about how to harmonize conflicts over the 
scope or frontiers of that structure.  Which groups participate in the liberal 
structure of argument, and which are left out?20  As we will see momentarily—
unlike the approach taken by Koskenniemi—this is a racialized form of 
naturalizing juridical science, or what I call racial ideology. 
Of course, the question of who’s in and who’s out of the global order has been 
among the central questions of postcolonial studies.21  For instance, in his 
 
19. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT (2006).  A classic statement of this view of sovereignty is reflected in EMER DE 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent 
trans., 2008). 
20. Notice that the question of participation here is not a question about the empirical realities of 
the international legal order.  It is rather a question of legal argument, and who is considered 
deserving of engaging in this structure of legal argument. 
21. See, e.g., KWAME NKRUMAH, NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM (1965). 
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illuminating Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 
Antony Anghie agreed that the traditional starting point in international legal 
thought has been about how to justify the existence of rules that could bind 
sovereign states.22  But Anghie argued that the quest to justify the limitation of that 
question to only certain populations served as a guarantee for the rest of the 
system, and that the relation between this limitation and the system’s making had 
yet to be understood.23  For while it may have been true that the premise of 
sovereign equality made it difficult to justify a legal order, Anghie pointed out that 
the concept of sovereign equality came into being in a prefigured context of 
domination and subordination.  That is, the cultural character of sovereignty was 
itself defined by the way international legal thought answered the question of 
scope.24  This is Anghie’s well known theory of the dynamic of difference, in which 
the sovereign form was defined by way of its cultural other.25 
What is generally missing in the international law literatures of critical and 
postcolonial studies, however, is an analysis of racial ideology and its legal 
structures.26  To analyze the legal structure of racial ideology, and yet still remain 
within the confines of From Apology to Utopia’s understanding of liberal 
legalism, I retain the ideological focus on structures of mediation and 
harmonization.  But the mediating function is different in the context of 
exclusion than in the context of equality.  After all, if the claim from State A is 
that they are a people with governing power over a specified territory, and that 
this people understands itself as subject to no higher forms of legal or political 
authority, it does not make much sense for State B to argue that State A has 
impliedly consented to the rule that State A ought to be excluded from the family 
of sovereign states.  That is exactly the opposite of what they are saying.  The device 
of tacit consent is consequently too narrow to justify excluding certain peoples 
from the structure itself. 
Furthermore, while I follow Anghie’s lead in interrogating the cultural 
constitution of sovereignty, I set aside Anghie’s dynamic of difference as it is too 
 
22. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). 
23. Id. at 3–8. 
24. There are many examples of the use of race as a means of exclusion throughout U.S. law, as well 
as in international law.  On the domestic side, critical race theory has done the most in pursuit 
of the point.  See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(rev. ed. 2006); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (1991).  For helpful discussion of the point at a broader level, see THOMAS MCCARTHY, RACE, 
EMPIRE, AND THE IDEA OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2009). 
25. ANGHIE, supra note 22, at 3–4. 
26. Much of the current attention views race as peripheral to international legal thought.  See, e.g., 
Martti Koskenniemi, Race, Hierarchy, and Legal Science: Lorimer’s Legal Science, 27 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 415 (2016). 
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broad as an explanatory device.  The dynamic of difference attends us-them 
relations going back into antiquity, well before the invention of racial ideology.  For 
liberals working in the nineteenth century, something more than “positivism” was 
required that might serve as a foundation for separating out an us from a them, and 
it is here that race becomes a form of naturalizing juridical science in the liberal 
hunt for harmonious justification for the gap between equality and exclusion.  We 
end up with a racial ideology the function of which is to justify: (1) a particular a 
structure of rules; and (2) a structure of argumentative practice. 
In a “classic” mode of liberal legal thought, sovereignty is premised on key 
themes duplicated in the context of private property.27  Sovereignty is at its core 
about autonomy and self-determination, distilled in the rule that all sovereigns 
have the right to exclude other sovereigns from the places and communities they 
call their own.  This right to exclude, however, is necessarily indeterminate.  Who 
exactly gets to exclude who from where and from what?  The answers quickly 
multiply: There is the sovereign right to exclude other sovereigns from discrete 
territories.  There is the sovereign right to exclude other “sovereigns” from the 
community of sovereigns.  There is the sovereign right to exclude nonstate actors 
from each of these separate domains.  In the classic liberal style, these statements 
about exclusion and sovereignty intertwine in the following rule: Only racially 
superior populations of human beings are naturally able to achieve the legal status 
of sovereignty, and it is only the sovereign state that may rightfully exclude other 
sovereigns from its territory and community.28 
As was argued repeatedly by nineteenth century jurists defending this 
exclusionary effort, only racially superior sovereigns were bound by the laws of 
territorial integrity and nonintervention.29  If a racially superior state sought to 
use force on a territory belonging to a racially inferior people, the rules governing 
the ensuing violence were purely “moral.”30  Thus, in the classic style of liberal 
legal thought, the general argument began with the three theses of liberal legalism: 
(1) freedom of right (for whom?); (2) ordered liberty (for whom?); and (3) a 
harmonizing rule of law.  Taken together, these three theses provide the basic 
 
27. See, e.g., ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE, 1500–2000 (2014); 
Justin Desautels-Stein, The Realist and the Visionary: On the Problem of Social Change in the 
History of International Legal Thought, in CONTINGENCY IN THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW COULD HAVE BEEN (Kevin Jon Heller & Ingo Venzke eds., 
forthcoming 2021). 
28. For discussion of racial superiority and political status, see BAUM, supra note 10; HANNAFORD, 
supra note 10. 
29. See, e.g., PAINTER, supra note 11; STEPAN, supra note 11. 
30. See, e.g., THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231–
33 (1860).  
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contours for the liberal concept of sovereignty.  Next, restrict the presumption of 
sovereign equality to a certain few: those peoples ranking as fully human.  Finally, 
these restrictions must be justifiable from within the borders of liberal theory, and 
the empiricism of race science fit the bill perfectly.31  But this construction of the 
racial sovereign is necessarily in the background, constituting the very idea of what 
counts as a full participant in the international legal order.32 
As a structure of argument, nineteenth century jurists deployed a racial 
ideology for excluding those sovereigns enjoying the full arsenal of international 
legal rights from those that did not.  This strategy included the use of new legal 
concepts like “the Great Powers” and “the Family of Nations.”  And just as the 
science of race emerged as a means for producing a hierarchy of value in human 
classification,33 so too did it function to discriminate between those racially 
superior states enjoying full international legal personality, and those that did 
not.34  Importantly, this exclusionary effort did not simply mean that nonwhite 
nations enjoyed fewer rights than the so-called white nations.  It meant that when 
nations attacking under cover of whiteness would invade those racially inferior 
nations, the laws of war simply did not apply.  Even more importantly, this form of 
exclusion was indigenous to liberal theory, predicated on empirical epistemology 
rather than religion or culture.  Racial exclusion was justifiable because it was 
knowable as natural science.  And if it was knowable as natural science it was 
knowable as legal science.  The result is a working definition of a racial ideology: a 
form of naturalizing juridical science in which patterns of argumentative practice 
at once give structure to indeterminate legal concepts and justify relations of 
domination through the use of seemingly neutral racial classifications.35 
 
31. On the early relation between empiricism and liberalism, see generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY 
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1979) (1689), and DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Stephen 
Buckle ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (1748). 
32. Sumi Cho & Gil Gott, The Racial Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY, EMERGENCY, LEGALITY 182 
(Austin Sarat ed., 2010).  
33. An obvious analogue here is the problem of slavery in the United States.  See, e.g., WILLIAM 
HARPER ET AL., THE PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENT: AS MAINTAINED BY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED 
WRITERS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES: CONTAINING THE SEVERAL ESSAYS ON THE SUBJECT, OF 
CHANCELLOR HARPER, GOVERNOR HAMMOND, DR. SIMMS, AND PROFESSOR DEW (Walker, 
Richards & Co., 1853); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES 
TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–1812 (1968). 
34. See TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL 
COMMUNITIES: ON THE RIGHT AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE 120 (1861).  See also 
the earlier discussion of “modified natural law” in DIETRICH HEINRICH LUDWIG VON OMPTEDA, 
LITERATURE ON THE ENTIRETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BOTH NATURAL AND POSITIVE (1785). 
35. For more on ideology in the legal context, see Desautels-Stein and Rasulov, supra note 7. See 
also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1998). 
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This emphasis on the ideological function of justification, and the role that 
the science of racial categories has played in the process of circumscribing 
liberalism, has much in common with Roland Barthes’s well-known analysis of 
myth.36  As Barthes explained, a mythical ideology “has the task of giving a 
historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear 
eternal.”37  The principal figures in this process, Barthes continued, were 
inoculation, tautology, and the privation of history.38  As discussed above, the story 
of race science and the invention of whiteness deploy these figures systematically.  
Indeed, racial ideology takes historical reality and gives the new concept of race a 
natural orientation, covering up contingency with necessity.39  Racial ideology, in 
this sense, depoliticizes in the service of rendering a history of slavery, 
discrimination, exploitation, and destruction, as natural, neutral, and necessary, “a 
harmonious display of [human] essences.”40  Barthes explained that the 
exnomination of belief—the resistance to naming—is itself an indication of 
ideological naturalization. 
Diagnosing the mythology of the bourgeoisie, Barthes pointed to the various 
registers in which that set of beliefs operates.  At the economic level, there is little 
in the way of denial.  The economic system of the bourgeoisie was capitalism, plain 
and simple.  At the political level, things get murkier.  There has never been a 
“Bourgeois Party,” so named.  But at the level of ideology, Barthes suggested, 
bourgeois beliefs disappear completely.  “The bourgeoisie has obliterated its 
name . . . it makes its status undergo a real exnominating operation: the 
bourgeoisie is defined as the social class which does not want to be named.”41  
Ideological success, said Barthes, becomes knowable by way of a “locus of an 
unceasing hemorrhage: meaning flows out of [the bourgeois] until [its] very name 
becomes unnecessary.”42  This bleeding of the concept out and into every crevice 
of the culture, just as the concept of race has done today, signals a naturalization of 
the concept so powerful we could call it hegemonic.  As Barthes continues: 
[I]n a bourgeois culture, there is neither proletarian culture nor 
proletarian morality, there is no proletarian art; ideologically, all that is 
not bourgeois is obliged to borrow from the bourgeoisie.  Bourgeois 
ideology can therefore spread over everything and in doing so lose its 
name without risk: no one here will throw this name of bourgeois back 
 
36. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 34 (Richard Howard & Annette Lavers trans., 2d ed. 2013). 
37. Id. at 254. 
38. Id. at 267. 
39. Id. at 254. 
40. Id. at 255. 
41. Id. at 250. 
42. Id. 
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at it.  It can without resistance subsume bourgeois theater, art, and 
humanity under their eternal analogues; in a word, it can exnominate 
itself without restraint when there is only one single human nature left: 
the defection from the name bourgeois is here complete.43 
Whereas mystification involves a hiding of ideology through a series of 
argumentative techniques, legitimation involves the different work of 
consolidating the ideology as not only a natural feature of social life (the way it is), 
but a legitimate feature of social life (the way it ought to be).  If ideology successfully 
sheds its name in the way the snake sheds its skin, legitimation follows a similar 
route.  And so, Barthes notes:   
[J]ust as bourgeois ideology is defined by the abandonment of the name 
bourgeois, so myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of 
things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made.  The 
world enters languages as a dialectical relation between activities, 
between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of 
essences.  A conjuring trick has taken place; it has turned reality inside 
out, it has emptied it of history and has filled it with nature, it has 
removed from things their human meaning so as to make them signify 
a human insignificance.44 
What Barthes said of bourgeois ideology, we can now say of racial ideology.45  
Of course, racial ideology offers different justifications in different places and 
different times, a point one would be mistaken to treat carelessly.  Indeed, not only 
the justifications of racial ideology, but racism itself, are historically dependent, 
varied in context.46  Nevertheless, I claim that racial ideology played a special role 
 
43. Id. at 251. 
44. Id. at 255 (emphasis added). 
45. Influential works on my thinking about racial ideology include NAHUM DIMITRI CHANDLER, X: 
THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGRO AS A PROBLEM FOR THOUGHT (2013); DENISE FERREIRA DA SILVA, 
TOWARD A GLOBAL IDEA OF RACE (2007); SAIDIYA HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION (1997); 
FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Richard Philcox trans., Grove Press 2008); 
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1976); EUGENE D. 
GENOVESE, IN RED AND BLACK: MARXIAN EXPLORATIONS IN SOUTHERN AND AFRO-AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1971) [hereinafter GENOVESE, IN RED AND BLACK]; C. L. R. JAMES, THE BLACK 
JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L’OVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION (Vintage Books ed. 
1989) (1963); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL 
TRADITION (Univ. N.C. Press 2000) (1983); FRED MOTEN, IN THE BREAK: THE AESTHETICS OF 
THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (2003); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN 
POWER AND BARE LIFE  (1998); and JOHN B. THOMPSON, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 
5–6 (1984). 
46. For arguments on the disaggregated state of racial identity, see KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY 
FATHER’S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE (1992); PAUL GILROY, BETWEEN CAMPS: 
NATIONS, CULTURES AND THE ALLURE OF RACE (2000) [hereinafter GILROY, BETWEEN CAMPS]; 
PAUL GILROY, ‘THERE AIN’T NO BLACK IN THE UNION JACK’: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF RACE 
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within the global context of liberal legal thought: to both produce and defend the 
delimitation of liberalism to the circle of whiteness.47  Or to put this in Charles 
Mills’s language, it is the function of racial ideology to rationalize and justify 
liberalism in the register of the racial contract.  Or as Anthony Farley has suggested, 
the original moment of departure from the natural world was also a moment in 
which the members of the new society who would be ruled were distinguished 
from those who would rule it.48  If the racial contract required liberal justification, 
or in other words, if the human mind desired a rationale for just why it was that all 
human beings were not “full persons” after all, then the mark of science was the 
answer.49  Or as Barbara Fields argued, “Racial ideology supplied the means of 
explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on radical 
doctrines of liberty and natural rights . . . .  Race explained why some people could 
rightly be denied what others took for granted: namely, liberty, supposedly a self-
 
AND NATION (1987); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); and Kenneth W. 
Warren, Appeals for (Mis)recognition: Theorizing the Diaspora, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES 
IMPERIALISM 392 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993).  On the contextualization of race 
and racism, see, for example, Olindo De Napoli, Race and Empire: The Legitimation of Italian 
Colonialism in Juridical Thought, 85 J. MOD. HIST. 801 (2013); George M. Fredrickson, Diverse 
Republics: French & American Responses to Racial Pluralism, 134 DAEDALUS 88 (2005); David 
A. Hollinger, The One Drop Rule & The One Hate Rule, 134 DAEDALUS 18 (2005); Christopher 
J. Lee, Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis in the Colonies: The Interwar Politics of Race, Culture, and 
Multiracial Legal Status in British Africa, 29 L. & HIST. REV. 497 (2011); Shu-Mei Shih, 
Comparative Racialization: An Introduction, 123 PMLA 1347 (2008); and Hulme T. 
Siwundhla, White Ideologies and Non-European Participation in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899–
1902, 15 J. BLACK STUD. 223 (1984). 
47. SILVA, supra note 45, at 29. A complication concerns the very distinction between black and 
white, and the framing power of that distinction.  For discussion, see, for example, LINDA 
MARTÍN ALCOFF, THE FUTURE OF WHITENESS (2015); MANNING MARABLE, BEYOND BLACK & 
WHITE: TRANSFORMING AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS (1995); Kathryn T. Gines, Critical 
Philosophy of Race Beyond the Black/White Binary, 1 CRITICAL PHIL. RACE 28 (2013); and 
Theresa H. Pfeifer, Deconstructing Cartesian Dualisms of Western Racialized Systems: A Study 
in the Colors Black and White, 39 J. BLACK STUD. 528 (2009). 
48. See Anthony Paul Farley, The Colorline as Capitalist Accumulation, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 953 (2008). 
49. SILVA, supra note 45, at 105; GILROY, BETWEEN CAMPS, supra note 46, at 31 (“Though it would 
be foolish to suggest that evil, brutality, and terror commence with the arrival of scientific 
racism toward the end of the eighteenth century, it would also be wrong to overlook the 
significance of that moment as a break point in the development of modern thinking about 
humanity and its nature.”); see also GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 56 
(2002) (“The scientific thought of the Enlightenment was a precondition for the growth of a 
modern racism based on physical typology.”); ROBERT MILES & MALCOLM BROWN, RACISM 39–
44 (2003); Jenny Reardon & Kim TallBear, “Your DNA is Our History”: Genomics, 
Anthropology, and the Construction of Whiteness as Property, 53 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
S233 (2012); Peter Wade et al., Nation and the Absent Presence of Race in Latin American 
Genomics, 55 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 497 (2014). 
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evident gift of nature’s God.”50  Those who were marked could not be parties to the 
social contract, members of the new society.  “The masters come together as one 
through the mark,” Farley continued, “After the mark, we are white-over-Black.”51 
Curiously, while the story of this connection between racial ideology and 
international law is not unknown in the international literatures of critical legal 
studies and TWAIL, it is certainly underplayed.  This absence may be the result of 
a number of factors, but when taken together are rather complementary in 
masking the contemporary presence of a racial ideology.   
There are two general kinds of criticism here.  First, there are those critics 
disposed toward thinking of the international in terms of identity and domination 
but see a singular focus on race as misguided in one way or another.  For example, 
some might see a focus on racial exclusion in the nineteenth century as something 
of a nonstarter, since international law has since found its way out of that particular 
mess: to substitute exclusion with inclusion.  Our contemporary problems, 
according to this view, are much broader and more complicated than the vulgar 
racism of the past.  Similarly, when it comes to the identity markers in question, 
TWAIL scholarship in particular, and postcolonial theory in general, are often 
more preoccupied with cultural prejudices rather than racial ones.  Or, these 
scholars would at least argue that some intersectional combination of vectors—as 
opposed to a special focus on race—is the better bet. 
Second, there are those critics for whom a focus on the structure of ideology 
remains out of touch with reality.  The more “concrete” preference is to seek out 
the proper social, political, or economic contexts of international law.  These 
contexts might be rather narrow and particular, or very broad and general.  In any 
case, the mistake is to confuse the abstractions of international legal thought with 
the grounded complexities of real power.52  I will briefly elaborate on each of these 
criticisms—(i) the mistaken focus on race, and (ii) the mistaken focus on 
ideological structure—and offer a synopsis of response. 
Within the first family of criticisms, one reason provided for failing to 
account for the history of racial ideology in international law is the sense that it is 
an old problem with an obvious solution.  In Boundaries of the International, 
Jennifer Pitts provides a study of international legal thought very much in keeping 
 
50. Barbara Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America, 181 NEW LEFT REV. 
95, 114 (1990).  Though Fields understood that the scientific construction of race was entirely 
wrong, as elaborated infra, she maintained that through “the ritual repetition of the appropriate 
social behaviour,” racial ideology was entirely “real.”  Id. at 113. 
51. Farley, supra note 48, at 953. 
52. SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND 
THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 62 (2000). 
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with the spirit of this Article.53  As she explains, “the law of nations is Europe’s 
distinctively successful solution to universal problems of order . . . especially 
pernicious as a source of justifications for and obfuscations of European imperial 
domination.”54  Shortly thereafter, Pitts explains that European imperialism is 
sometimes characterized as a problem of exclusion, wherein a model of 
sovereignty was first developed in Europe and then jealously kept there.  On this 
view, the solution was to expand the European system into an international 
system, extending the benefits of sovereignty to the newly independent states.55 
What is problematic about this framing—as Pitts rightly points out—is that 
if the imperialism of international law is characterized as an initial form of 
exclusion, and inclusion is then proffered as the remedy, we do not actually get 
very far in dealing with the problem of domination and subordination in our 
contemporary world.56  For one thing, non-Europeans were often “included” in 
the arrangements of nineteenth century international law that were supposedly 
exclusionary, as in the case of the much-discussed capitulation treaties.57  For 
another, a more meaningful form of inclusion was the inspiration of much 
twentieth century international legal thought, and even if we still have some ways 
to go, the road to reform was laid long ago: If exclusion was the problem, the 
League of Nations, and then considerably better, the United Nations, made great 
strides beyond the Family of Nations.  In this way, it would seem the problems of 
racism and exclusionary practice go together, and so when the international legal 
order became more inclusive in the second half of the twentieth century, it became 
less racist as well.  The contemporary architecture of the UN system, with its 
Special Rapporteurs and the ICERD, seems to attest to this very point: Exclusion 
and racism are hardly what they once were.  As a result, the problem with focusing 
on exclusion is two-sided: Either you miss the fact that outsiders were increasingly 
included,58 or you miss the fact that this form of inclusion simply reproduced other 
forms of domination and subordination.59 
A second and related issue within the first family of criticisms concerns the 
contemporary relationship between race and competing identity markers, such as 
culture, ethnicity, nationality, and gender.  If racism should not be a cause for 
concern either because (a) it is no longer an international problem, or (b) it 
 
53. JENNIFER PITTS, BOUNDARIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL: LAW AND EMPIRE (2018). 
54. Id. at 6. 
55. Id. at 13–14. 
56.     Id. at 9–10.   
57. Id. at 37.  Or consider the uber-example of the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905. 
58. See generally, JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (Harv. Univ. Press 2001) (1999).  
59. AGAMBEN, supra note 45, at 107. 
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remains an international problem but no longer the problem it once was, scholars 
argue that the same cannot be said about these other markers.60 
As Mohammad Shahabuddin has ably explained, international legal thought 
in the nineteenth century contested the role of ethnicity and culture, rather than 
race.  This contest is best characterized as between two traditions: the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism.61  In each case, international lawyers reflected 
contrasting visions of how to construct the nation state.  In the Enlightenment 
tradition, a European culture of rights and reason was expected to gradually 
assimilate the rest of the non-European world, introducing the uncivilized into the 
Family of Nations.62  In the Romantic tradition, culture was more hardwired into 
the ethnic core of nations, thus serving as a more concrete barrier of religious, 
linguistic, and racial constituencies.63  Sometimes, Shahabuddin explains, the 
Enlightenment and Romantic traditions influenced vying views of the 
international legal order, while at others the two views came together in a single 
treaty.64  In any case, and what is of most relevance here, Shahabuddin emphasizes 
that this conflict between traditions was a story about ethnicity and culture—race 
was important in the broader scheme of prejudices, to be sure, but it never served 
as a source of ideological justification, as ethnocultures did.  Race was, in this view, 
a more passive acted-upon object, while ethnoculture was doing all the heavy 
lifting.  And while race today seems far less problematic, the “clash of civilizations” 
and the parade of “ethnic conflict” seems to see no end. 
If historians like Pitts and Shahabuddin suggest a focus away from race in 
their admirable examinations of international law’s empire, a different reason for 
rejecting the history of racial ideology concerns the historian’s conventional way 
of defining “context.”65  In their recent Rage for Order, Lauren Benton and Lisa 
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Ford offer a criticism of this kind, arguing for histories of international law that 
differ significantly from the approach of ideological structure.66  For Benton and 
Ford, studying “Vattelian visions of sovereignty,” or the “articulation of a standard 
of civilization from which certain colonial peripheries were tidily excluded,” is 
largely just bad history.67  In fact, to better understand international law’s role in 
the history of empire, historians should “look away from international law and 
international lawyers”68 and toward a legal vernacular unlike anything found in 
the works of a Johann Bluntschli or an Elihu Root.  Rather than study the language 
of international legal thought, Benton and Ford suggest that it would be better to 
locate more concrete, on-the-ground contexts in which law actually formed and 
made a difference.69  This orientation ought to lead the historian to hunt “men in 
the middle,” “participants in a vernacular imperial constitutionalism with regional 
variants and potentially global reach.”70  Unavailable in the “tomes of jurists” or 
“the usual fixtures of the field,”71 this more realistic history of an imperial 
international law is hardly “international law” at all: It is instead the fluid 
vernacular of an imperial constitution, adopted and enforced in the professional 
crannies of the British Empire.  As Benton and Ford attest: 
Outside the empire, Foreign Office officials, naval officers, and roving 
bureaucrats collaborated to cast a thin skein of jurisdiction over oceans 
by stretching municipal (domestic) law to its limit . . . .  It was the 
medium of multiple, parallel projects of imperial change . . . . [A]n 
endemic and eclectic genre, and it was often a tedious one—the stuff of 
long dispatches and arcane complaints, occasionally leavened by juicy 
scandal.  The traces of this story hide within the pages of untidy 
commission reports, obscure manuals of colonial administration, and 
hagiographies of law-minded governors.72 
If this second reason for refuting the relevance of a “totalizing” structure of 
racial ideology is about the more pressing need to canvass the complexities of the 
vulgate, a related sort of complaint concerns a demand for a different sort of 
contextualism.  For whereas Benton and Ford study vernacular contexts, others 
seek to understand international law in more macro-contexts, such as the 
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politicoeconomic “reality” of the international system.  For instance, in 
International Law and World Order, B.S. Chimni argues for an “integrated” 
approach to international law, one that incorporates Marxism, feminism, and 
TWAIL.73  In the process of building this account, Chimni criticized earlier 
versions of the structuralist approach offered in this Article, suggesting that the 
reality of European power cannot be understood “by merely looking at the internal 
structure of international law.”74  What is necessary instead is a treatment of the 
historical and political contexts in which the structures of international law get 
their meaning, in which the forces of capitalism bend law to its needs.75  
Referencing the twin poles of freedom and order, Chimni continued, “[t]he reality 
and ideology of universalizing capital configures and circumscribes the ideas of 
autonomy and community in different ways in different eras.”76  Without 
appreciating these extralegal contexts, thinkers in the structuralist tradition 
remain in jeopardy of being “unwittingly incarcerated in a Eurocentric discourse 
of international law.”77 
A focus on the “reality” of the international system naturally leads to some 
strange bedfellows, as the leftwing Chimni here finds an ally in the retroclassical 
scholar John Yoo.  Like Chimni, Yoo desires an international law more in tune 
with the demands of power.  The difference is that while they both see these 
demands as the decisive variables, their prescriptions move in opposite directions.  
Chimni desires a Third World/feminist/Marxist approach to international law’s 
power dynamics.  But in Point of Attack, Yoo’s argument for making international 
law more responsive to the system’s power structure is not any of these things.  
Instead, it is a fascinating piece of advocacy for a global increase in government-
sponsored killing.78  Yoo argues that as we move toward a contemporary 
international law that encourages states he calls the “great powers” to use more 
violence in foreign territories, international society will enjoy a total increase in 
“global welfare.”79  It is not merely that international law would transform in the 
effort to better legitimize the killing of the weak by the strong.  Yoo suggests that 
certain types of irrational states should be excluded from the same rights of 
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violence enjoyed by the Great Powers.80  For example, while the United States will 
be legally justified in the killing of suspected terrorists in Egypt, Egypt would be 
legally barred from targeting individuals in U.S. territory, assuming Egypt had 
determined that the United States was unable or unwilling to take action against 
what Egypt understood to pose a substantial threat.  As Kenneth Anderson 
colorfully puts the idea: 
States are not all the same . . . .  No rational US leader is going to take the 
solemn international law admonition of the “sovereign equality of 
states” too seriously in these matters—and the United States has never 
regarded a refusal to do so as contrary to international law but instead 
as something built into international law as a qualification on the 
reach of the “sovereign equality” of states.  There will not be 
“Predators over Paris, France,” any more than there will be “Predators 
over Paris, Texas,” but Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and points beyond 
are a different story.81 
Thinkers like Yoo and Anderson suggest that the UN Charter’s theory of self-
defense and general approach to state-sponsored use of force is hopelessly 
outdated in today’s world.  In order to better increase global welfare, we need a new 
international law that better incentivizes the use of force.  This is in obvious 
contrast to a system whose purpose is to keep the use of force to a minimum, if not 
to abolish it completely.  This type of argument suggests that if international law 
better incentivized states to use force, terrorists would have fewer safe harbors in 
the world and the lives of a majority of the world’s people would be better on the 
whole.  Yoo proposes that—rather than looking to the UN Charter and its rules of 
self-defense—we are better served looking deeper into the past, to the Great 
Powers system that emerged after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.82  That system, 
Yoo believes, will replace the United Nations’s equality standard with an 
exclusionary standard in which the Great Powers serve as global police, hunting 
down and killing criminals.  Those states not rational enough to warrant 
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membership in the Great Powers enjoy far fewer rights and are not presumed to be 
legal equals.  Yoo argues that the Great Powers system makes much more sense in 
part because the UN system was established on the basis of an historical anomaly.  
For Yoo, the architects of the League of Nations and UN were motivated by 
attachments to medieval just war theory, which simply made no sense in the 
context of twentieth century power politics.83  In other words, the move to 
institutions that began in the early twentieth century was a mistake from the start, 
building out of intellectual foundations that were simply anachronistic.  The Great 
Powers system of the nineteenth century, in conclusion, is the more realistic choice 
for today. 
Thus, the structural approach to racial ideology produces two general kinds 
of anxiety.  First is the view that either the problems once posed by racialized 
exclusion have been solved, or if they have not, a focus on race alone is an 
insufficient solution.  Related to this first view is also the point that while race was 
once an explicit feature of international law, the real problems for contemporary 
international lawyers are better situated in the language of culture, if not a more 
general intersectionality.  Second, there is the view that a focus on ideological 
structure misses the crucial contexts in which these ideologies gain their traction 
and meaning.  These contexts might take us away from international legal thought 
altogether and toward the legal vernacular, or they might take us into the more 
general territory of power politics and the global economy.  In any case, the 
problem here is that absent sufficient emphasis on the right context, a structural 
analysis will not adequately reflect the international system’s historical reality. 
These are all important concerns, and in the space of this Article I cannot 
hope to give them the attention they demand.  But I can offer some brief and 
provocative—though hopefully not too provocative—responses.  With respect to 
the first family of complaints about the contemporary relevance of racial 
exclusion, Pitts is right to echo the postcolonial insight that if one frames 
international law’s empire as a problem of exclusion, the natural next step seems 
to be a turn to inclusion, and that this “next step” is seriously ill-equipped.84  To 
think as much is to misunderstand how the powerful dominate the powerless, even 
after the powerless are included.  I agree wholeheartedly, and this is why I treat 
racial exclusion as a morphing ideology in liberal legal thought.  If the treatment 
were to end with a statement on the logics by which the peoples of the world have 
been excluded from the full ambit of international rights, the shifting patterns of 
argument found among the moderns might very well come off as the progressive 
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denouement of an ugly period in international legal history.  But that is not the 
story.  As I argue below, it is precisely in the context of a more inclusive structure 
of racial ideology that international law transformed in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.  As I will suggest in the context of modern liberalism, racial 
ideology morphed into a different structure of naturalizing juridical science.  At 
the level of the law of sovereigns, race receded as a means for excluding other 
peoples from the realm of international legal personality.  But while the demise of 
a racialized logic of exclusion actively foregrounded the prohibitive work of the 
antidiscrimination principle, race simultaneously fortified a twinned right of 
exclusion for sovereigns seeking to control their borders.  As I argue elsewhere, 
racial ideology later morphed at this juncture, entering into an alliance with a 
postmodern pragmatism and yielding a contemporary form of postracial ideology 
in international legal thought.85  All of this is to say that I am fully sympathetic with 
the concern about the study of racial exclusion as leading to a dead end.  My 
response to this is simply that rather than seeing exclusion as masking the reality 
of domination, one ought to see the right to exclude—a result of this morphed 
form of racial ideology—as both producing the very idea of the racial subject, as 
well as sustaining racial hierarchy right up to the present. 
With respect to the related concern about raising racial analysis over the 
study of culture, I have been heavily influenced here by the literature on 
neoracism.86  In a word, while I wholeheartedly endorse the TWAIL emphasis on 
cultural subordination as a crucially important variable, I also see the elevation of 
cultural studies as a moment in which a new and subversive form of raciality has 
come to thrive behind the scenes.  What’s more, while I am in complete agreement 
with the theory of intersectionality as key for understanding the breadth of the 
international legal order, I also see the emphasis on that breadth as coming at a 
cost.  That cost is what we sometimes lose in terms of understanding the very 
peculiar function of race in constituting our patterns of justification. 
With respect to the second family of complaints, I am certainly attentive to 
the necessity of “context.”  Indeed, the study of “ideology” in international legal 
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thought might seem to be just the sort of old intellectual history that is now well 
behind the times.87  It was twenty years ago that Susan Marks was positioning her 
own work on ideology as outdated, pointing to the “end of ideology” theorists on 
the one side and the postmoderns on the other, all of whom were arguing for the 
lack of use in the study of “ideology.”88  For the end of ideology camp, ideology 
reflected a kind of worldview that had simply gone out of style, while for the 
postmoderns, ideology reflected a kind of totality that never was.  It is certainly fair 
to say that in the decades since Marks’s publication, the study of “ideology” has 
remained—at best—a peripheral exercise. 
Nevertheless, I remain wholly persuaded that Marks was on the right track 
and that a structural approach to racial ideology is sorely missing in today’s 
international law debates.  I believe this is so for the reasons just mentioned 
regarding the salience of race and neoracism.  Further, the study of ideology can 
also serve as a mode of contextualist historiography.  Consider the critiques of 
Benton, Ford, Chimni, and Yoo at the level of historical method.  While the 
particular contexts in which they study international law differ greatly, and while 
their proposals differ even more, they all share the view that whatever language 
there is in international legal thought, it must be understood in some context 
outside of or external to that language.  That is, it would be a mistake to study the 
language without a context in which to place it, whether that be the 
correspondences of English imperialists in the nineteenth century, the nature of 
capitalism in the twentieth, or the prospects of bioterrorism in the twenty-first. 
These contexts have their place, and in various respects they all are edifying.  
But understanding international law in the context of racial ideology is just as 
contextualist as any of these methods.  It is a mistake to believe that because the 
context of racial ideology is somehow internal to international law, it is therefore 
illegible as a proper context in which to understand international law’s history.  
What’s more, the whole business of characterizing certain contexts as external to 
law and therefore more edifying seems largely unhelpful:89 The dismissal of 
ideology-critique as irrelevant to the “real” contexts of international law must 
rest on something more substantial than a flimsy internal-external distinction.  
If we are to blind ourselves to the contexts of racial ideology in international 
legal thought, it must be because there is really nothing to see.  And I submit that 
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if you believe there is nothing to see in the structure of racial ideology, you need 
to keep reading. 
In sum, my claim about the context of racial ideology in international legal 
thought is as follows: In international law a classic mode of racial ideology 
generated a legal conception of sovereignty through a process of racial subjection, 
as universal and always already delimited by the lights of a naturalizing science of 
racial classification.  A modern mode of racial ideology, in contrast, interprets the 
legal concept of sovereignty as universal, and justifies its expanding application to 
nonwhite peoples by the lights of a social science understanding of racial 
classification.  At the same time, in smuggling classic racial ideology away from the 
formal apparatus of international society, modern racial ideology instantiates the 
classic form of racial subjection at a different borderland, one between members of 
a national community and the “other.”  Modern racial ideology, as a result, is two-
sided.  It slowly develops a sense of racial equality and inclusion at the level of 
sovereign-sovereign relations, but also naturalizes a racialized right of individual 
sovereigns to exclude outsiders from the national community. 
In what follows I offer a short synopsis of each of these racial ideologies.  The 
story of postracial ideology in the era of international human rights is yet to come. 
II. CLASSIC RACIAL IDEOLOGY: EXCLUDING PEOPLES 
FROM INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
Throughout the nineteenth century, racial ideology fueled the sovereign’s 
right to exclude.  In the language of international law, this exclusionary ideology 
was an engine for legal justification that operated at the level of sovereign states.  
Empowered by this type of justification, the concept of the Family of Nations 
rested on the right of sovereigns to exclude peoples from the community of 
sovereigns.90  The relevant polis was global, and the task of what I am calling classic 
racial ideology was to justify and naturalize the rights of so-called racially superior 
peoples to exclude so-called racially inferior peoples from the circle of so-called 
rights-bearing sovereigns.  This sovereign right of exclusion was not characterized 
as a right to exclude individuals from a particular territory: Between recognized 
sovereigns—such as within the Family of Nations—migration was easy and 
open.91  It was not until the twentieth century that the border controls of today were 
justified by a sovereign right to exclude.  Before this, sovereign rights of exclusion 
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were focused on keeping entire peoples out of the Family of Nations, and not on 
keeping individual migrants out of a territory. 
To appreciate the transformations that occurred in international legal 
thought at the turn of the twentieth century, let us quickly recall that in 1823, then 
U.S. President James Monroe proclaimed the right of independence enjoyed by 
Spain’s former colonies in the Americas.92  What precisely was this right of 
independence to mean?  Was it an affirmation of sovereign equality, rights of legal 
personality and full participation in the Family of Nations?  In the 1820s the United 
States was still a peripheral sovereign in the international legal order, and it 
remained unclear what right the United States had to participate in the Family of 
Nations, much less what rights were due to the racially diverse and openly 
rebellious peoples occupying the rest of North and South America.93 
What was very clear, however, was the U.S. interest in preventing European 
conquest in the Western Hemisphere.  By 1845, the United States annexed Texas 
from Mexican control, and a few years later the Mexican-American War was in 
full bloom.  By the end of the conflict, Mexico had lost half of its territory to the 
United States.  And by the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was in a 
curious position with respect to the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine.  With its 
imperialist adventures in Panama, Cuba, and the Philippines, could the United 
States offer respect for an international rule of sovereign equality, with anything 
resembling a straight face?  From the perspective of many international lawyers 
and politicians in South America, the results of the Spanish-American War were 
racially motivated.  The United States was no defender of sovereign equality.  It was 
a bully and a bigot. 
As the Argentine international lawyer Alejandro Alvarez would later explain, 
what needed clarifying was the separation between the Monroe Doctrine, as it had 
crystallized into a rule of customary international law, and the hegemonic and 
imperialist policies of the United States.  What the Monroe Doctrine was “really” 
about, according to Alvarez, was the recognition of “acquired rights to 
independence, to non-intervention, and to non-colonization on the American 
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continent.”94  In contrast were U.S. policies which contradicted this commitment 
to sovereign equality:  
During the nineteenth century the United States built up alongside of 
this Doctrine a personal policy, which does not represent the interest of 
the continent, but quite the reverse; wherefore it inspires fear rather 
than sympathy in the states of Latin America.  This so-called policy of 
hegemony or supremacy consists in intervention by the United States, 
on behalf of its own interests, in the domestic affairs of certain states in 
Latin America . . . .95  
Nevertheless, Alvarez further suggested that the sovereign right of 
nonintervention could go only so far; if “civilization” demands a sovereign to abide 
by certain changes occurring in the international order, the fundamental right of 
the state to independence should give way.96  Alvarez explained:  
[A] State may not, on the ground that it is absolutely independent, 
isolate itself entirely from the other States or refuse to enter into 
relations with them.  The great Powers have compelled certain Asiatic 
States to open their doors to European commerce, and this action has 
been approved by the whole civilized world.97 
In the encounter with Latin American jurists like Alvarez, a legal task before 
the United States in the wake of new imperial control over the Philippines, Cuba, 
and Puerto Rico, was one of justification.98  If Alvarez was right, and the Monroe 
Doctrine stood above all else for a standard of sovereign equality, what legal 
justifications might warrant U.S. action everywhere from Panama to Hawaii?  
Indeed, this was precisely the concern motivating President William McKinley in 
his decision to appoint the New York lawyer Elihu Root as his Secretary of War.99  
Later to become a President of the American Society of International Law, 
Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State and Secretary of War, as well as a Chair of 
several of Andrew Carnegie’s corporate entities, McKinley’s charge to the man that 
would become his international law czar was to justify the U.S. record abroad. 
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In the years before World War I, Root gave an array of public lectures both in 
the United States and throughout Latin America.  Root repeatedly agreed with 
Alvarez that the principle underlying the Monroe Doctrine was “the right of every 
sovereign state to protect itself,” where “each state must judge for itself when a 
threatened act will create such a situation.”100  Root continued: 
The fundamental principle of international law is the principle of 
independent sovereignty.  Upon that all other rules of international law 
rest.  That is the chief and necessary protection of the weak against the 
power of the strong.  Observance of that is the necessary condition to 
the peace and order of the civilized world.  By the declaration of that 
principle the common judgment of civilization awards to the smallest 
and weakest state the liberty to control its own affairs without 
interference from any other Power, however great.101 
Two years later, Root addressed the American Society of International Law 
regarding a recently adopted declaration on the equality of nations.102  That 
declaration espoused that “[e]very nation is in law and before law the equal of 
every other nation . . . ,” and Root forcefully set this principle against the example 
of the warring states of Europe.103  At the same time, however, Root cautioned that 
this move toward a more fulsome sense of legal equality had to be realistic if it was to 
be effective.104  Commenting approvingly of Root’s “masterful” view of sovereign 
equality, Alvarez explained that what Root was talking about could not be the  
absolute equality of states, subjecting the more powerful to various 
kinds of restraint.  The equality that must be established . . . is legal 
equality, by virtue of which no state may, merely because of its 
superiority, have any claim or pretention to rights which are not 
recognized as belonging to weaker states.  All states must be equal before 
the law.105 
The point that needs to be emphasized here as we search for the coming 
transition into a modern form of racial ideology, is that while Root and Alvarez 
agreed on the need to consider Latin American sovereigns as equal members of the 
Family of Nations, they also agreed that this commitment to sovereign equality for 
states meant very little for the equality of the human races.  Not every people, in 
other words, deserved a sovereign state and a legal position in the Family of 
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Nations.  In Alvarez’s “Latin America and International Law,” for example, he 
argued for the importance of understanding the racial composition of the Latin 
American population.106  Unlike the “single race” of “whites” in Europe, Alvarez 
pointed in South America to the “conquering race” from Spain, the “negroes 
imported from Africa,” and the creoles, those children born in Latin America from 
European-born parents.107  Among these groups, the only “thinking” part of the 
population was the creole: The Spanish whites and the Africans either thought of 
Latin America as just another piece of Europe, or didn’t think at all.108  Indeed, in 
the course of Spanish-American independence and the various congresses and 
conventions that emerged in the first third of the nineteenth century, the 
political construction of the new sovereigns was highly racialized.109  The bottom 
line: While the new Latin American sovereigns would come to take a marginal 
place within the Family of Nations, this was participation only for racially 
recognizable sovereigns. 
In the context of Root’s work in the effort to elect Theodore Roosevelt, Root 
argued for a racial approach to equality from a different direction.  Anticipating 
Alvarez’s criticism of U.S. imperialism in the Western hemisphere, the 
Democratic Party’s political platform at the turn of the century regarded the 
paramount issue in the presidential election to be that of “imperialism.”110  To be 
sure, Root abided by a classic racial ideology by arguing in favor of sovereign 
equality for small and great states alike.  But was it imperialist for the United States 
to deny sovereign prerogatives to the Filipino people if they did not have the 
capacity for self-governance?  As Spain conceded control of the Philippines to the 
United States in 1899, ought the United States to have recognized the Filipino 
people as an independent sovereign, naturally endowed with rights of 
nonintervention and independence?  Or, as Root framed the question, ought the 
United States to have regarded as sovereign equals a “tribe” under the leadership 
of a “Chinese half-breed”?111  “Is there anything in the circumstances of the 
assistance which we have received from these men which entitles them to the 
reward of the sovereignty of the Philippines?”112  Root’s reply: “Nothing can be 
more preposterous than the proposition that these men were entitled to receive 
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from us sovereignty over the entire country which we were invading.”113  Only 
“Oriental treachery” might convince one otherwise.114 
Root’s suggestion was that like the American Indians, presumably not only 
those indigenous peoples living in the United States but those all throughout the 
Americas, the Filipino people ought to have realized that they enjoyed no 
entitlements over territory as against the United States.115  It is true, Root conceded, 
that democracies enjoy legitimacy from the consent of the people.  But “[n]othing 
can be more misleading,” Root cautioned, “than a principle misapplied.”116  If 
government arises among a people capable of making “free, intelligent and 
efficacious decisions,” then surely the government must be by and for that 
people.117  But Root asserted that the people of the Philippines were not of this 
stock, and simply “incapable of self-government.”118  To put this another way, did 
the United States have a right to exclude the Filipino people from sovereign status 
in the international legal order?  Armed with a clear-cut racial ideology of 
hierarchy, Root’s answer was not merely that the United States was justified in 
excluding the Filipino people from the community of sovereigns.  Rather, the 
United States was under an international legal obligation to do so, given the lack of 
racial competence rampant in the Philippines. 
Of course, the point here is not to single out Root for a racist perspective on 
the U.S. war in the Philippines.119  Rather, the purpose is to illuminate a classic form 
of racial ideology in international legal thought, which was hardly restricted to a 
few elite lawyers.  As Will Smiley has explained, “the war had been accompanied 
by fierce racist sentiments among Americans.”120  And these were not only the 
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sentiments of the American public; military officers engaged in questions about the 
applicability of the laws of war consistently relied on a racial ideology of inferiority to 
justify unusually violent allowances for the United States in its suppression of a 
“backward” race.121 
III. MODERN RACIAL IDEOLOGY: EXCLUDING PEOPLE 
FROM NATIONAL COMMUNITIES 
In his attempt to justify a particular understanding of sovereign equality in 
international law, we can see how Root structured an essentially indeterminate 
sovereignty concept by at once opening its application universally and restricting 
its application to racially superior peoples.  This is a classic mode of racial ideology, 
naturalizing what is a historically contingent argument about sovereignty by way 
of an appeal to the science of racial classification.  What I turn to now, however, is 
Root’s deployment of a modern mode of racial ideology, in contrast with the classic 
mode explored above.  As I explain in the remaining pages, modern racial ideology 
in international legal thought arose in the midst of a tremendously effective bait 
and switch.122 
To best understand this transition, we should start with what were at the time 
two separate views of racial equality.  The first kind was the weakening of the right 
to exclude peoples from international society, and which slowly gained ground as 
the Family of Nations model gave way to the new League of Nations.  This 
weakening led to the rise of a formal equality of sovereigns to participate in 
international society, and in particular, in the new international institutions.  And 
then there was a second kind of racial equality, distinct from the equality due to 
sovereigns operating in international society.  This was a view of racial equality 
regarding prohibitions on the rights of states to exclude individuals from entry into 
a national political community, and the enjoyment of certain freedoms once 
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inside.  In a word, this view of racial equality would have called for the emergence 
of an international migration law capable of regulating the rights of sovereigns to 
control their borders.  But while classic racial ideology justified the rights of 
sovereigns to exclude other sovereigns from their territories and from 
international society, modern racial ideology justified the rights of sovereigns to 
exclude individual people from their territories and from the national community.  
The bait and switch in international legal thought concerns a simultaneous 
fading of the classic mode, and emergence of the modern mode: While an 
ideology of inclusion was taking center stage at the level of international 
institutions, an ideology of exclusion was animating the emerging international 
law of migration.123 
As the architecture of the League of Nations came together, international 
lawyers agreed about how ineffective the new international institutions would be 
if they remained caught up in the old racial hierarchies of the nineteenth century.124  
These lawyers believed that whatever their racial inferiorities, all sovereigns should 
join the League, either as full members or as “members in training.”125  The 
question was whether this weakening of classic racial ideology suggested an open 
attitude toward migration, to the inclusion of racially diverse residents in national 
communities.  Or was that weakening only relevant to the inclusion of racially 
diverse peoples in the international community?  In response to a query for his 
feedback on the issue, Root told the American delegates in Versailles to oppose any 
language that pushed the idea of racial equality beyond the level of sovereign-
sovereign relations.  To do otherwise, Root counseled, would suggest a “plan for 
unlimited yellow immigration.”126  As Root had written earlier, “[w]ith the great 
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varieties of race and custom and conceptions of social morality in the human 
family the right of each nation to conduct its own internal affairs according to its 
own ideas is the essence of liberty.”127  Racism should not bar a sovereign state from 
being left alone to organize its own affairs—this was a version of the principle of 
self-determination Wilson was promoting.  At the same time, notions of racial 
equality could not tell sovereigns how to do the organizing. 
Indeed—and certainly in the United States—migration was increasingly 
seen as an issue best regulated by a sovereign’s right to exclude, rather than by 
treaty.128  Root elaborated on what he saw as the appropriate balance in a passage 
that would seem alien to the perspectives of today’s conservative politicians, 
explaining that it was essential for all sovereigns to abide by the procedures and 
decisions of international arbitrations and adjudications.  Importantly, this 
included the United States; every nation, regardless of its economic, military, or 
cultural achievements, ought to submit their claims to international law and its 
attendant mechanisms for conflict resolution.  This was a key for avoiding future 
wars, and Root thought that the League covenant did not go far enough in making 
the rules for international dispute resolution more effective.129  In this sense, all 
sovereign peoples were equals in the eyes of international law. 
But while the United States shared an interest with all other sovereigns in 
promoting a more effective and functional international law, it shared no interests 
at all in promoting the racial equality of individual human beings.  Choices about 
how to constitute and police the membership and boundaries of the new 
international community was a question for the new League; in contrast, questions 
about the membership of a sovereign’s own political and national community 
were “purely American affairs” and to be determined solely by domestic policy.130  
As Root explained, “The nations of Europe in general are nations from which 
emigrants go.  The United States is a nation to which immigrants come . . . Europe 
and America are bound to look at questions of emigration and immigration from 
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different points of view . . . .”131  There was simply no connection—as Root 
understood it—between accepting on the one hand that the United States would 
subject itself to international regulation by new institutions in the service of 
fostering world peace and the end of war, and accepting on the other hand that the 
League would be able to intervene in questions related to the right of the United 
States to exclude certain kinds of people from its borders.132  From Root’s outlook, 
international migration law simply could not exist.  As a result, Root suggested that 
the United States qualify its entrance into the League with an amendment reading 
in part, “the representatives of the United States of America sign this convention 
with the understanding that nothing therein contained shall be construed to imply 
a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward 
purely American questions . . . (including therein the admission of immigrants), to 
the decision or recommendation of other powers.”133 
So what exactly was going on here?  Why were the framers of the League 
Covenant so anxious about an affirmation of racial equality as relevant to 
migration questions, and yet potentially open to questions about legal personality 
in the international community?  As so many international lawyers in the United 
States and Europe recognized, international law’s race problem was shifting away 
from sovereign-sovereign relations and toward the question of whether a new field 
of international migration law might come to regulate a sovereign’s decisions 
about border control. 
At the time, the idea that sovereigns enjoyed a right to exclude individual 
migrants was new to the international legal order.  As international lawyers had 
explained for centuries, a sign of fluency with the Law of Nations was an open 
border between states.134  Nominally, and certainly by the nineteenth century, the 
status of sovereignty in the Family of Nations signaled an appreciation of open 
migration as commercial intercourse.  In this respect migration was often 
understood as merely a facet of the laissez-faire world of civilized legal relations.  
That said, the legal establishment of racial borders was not unknown.  Likely the 
most vivid example in opposition to the “free movement” regime of the Family of 
Nations was the situation for free African Americans in the antebellum United 
States.  As Kunal Parker has explained, for whatever the reality of other 
international pressures that might have pushed against a sovereign’s choice to 
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adopt national immigration control, at least in the United States the arrival of a 
national immigration law was held in abeyance for as long as individual states 
feared a loss in the rights to exclude African Americans from their territories.  It 
was only after the Civil War and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
slavery’s block on a national immigration law finally caved in.  But rather than the 
inclusionary ethos of radical reconstruction, it was precisely the slave states’ 
racialized right to exclude that rose to prominence in the now-national context of 
migrant exclusion.  Thus, while the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868 had cleared 
domestic obstacles for a national immigration law, it was only fourteen years later 
that Congress adopted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.135 
After World War I, the movement toward a national immigration regime and 
its attendant hostility toward Asians and new immigrant groups from Europe came 
into contact with the universalizing push for the new League of Nations.  
Immigration was increasingly viewed as a social problem demanding application of 
the best available, cutting-edge social science.  How should the United States 
approach the tremendous influx of persons moving into its territory?  Thinking 
about migration as free commercial intercourse did not make sense; it had not 
really ever made sense, at least in the United States, considering the situation first 
for freed slaves and then Chinese immigrants.  But now, with such an increase in 
migration from southeastern Europe, how could a new migration law best meet 
the country’s social need?  The answer was eugenics.136 
Through the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 (the Act),137 and inspired by a 
congressionally sponsored commission tasked with studying the science of race 
and migration, the United States established a domestic form of border control 
that bore all the marks of classic racial ideology.  It was hierarchical, exclusionary, 
and rooted in a science of race.  As Mae Ngai has written, “In a sense, demographic 
data was to twentieth century racists what craniometric data had been to race 
scientists during the nineteenth.  Like the phrenologists who preceded them, the 
eugenicists worked backward from classifications they defined a priori and 
declared a causal relationship between the data and race.”138  The Act quickly went 
global, inspiring sovereigns around the world to implement the newly forged and 
internationally ensconced right to exclude.  As Adam McKeown has argued, 
“Institutions that had their origins in exceptional methods necessary to preserve 
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the ideals of self-government from the threats of an uncivilized world had now 
become indispensable technologies of population management.  Their adoption 
became a prerequisite for recognition as a self-determining state in the 
international system.”139  The Act became the international gold standard for 
migration regulation.140  “It was the potent mix of race and self-rule that built a 
world of border control.”141 
These developments were entirely foreseen in Root’s assault on the racial 
equality clause that never made it into the League Covenant.  The racial ideology 
of inclusion that was rising in the context of sovereign participation in the 
international legal order was, at least in part, actively assisted by a racial ideology of 
exclusion at the level of the sovereign right to exclude migrants.  That is, just as 
classic racial ideology appeared to weaken at the formal level of sovereign relations, 
it was reemerging in another disciplinary field.  No longer the guardian of the 
border between the international community and racially inferior peoples, classic 
racial ideology moved forward as the justification for a right of sovereigns to police 
their territorial borders, guarding the border between the national community and 
racially inferior people.  But this bait and switch not only helped lay the ideological 
conditions for the Act.  It also helped to ensure that the field of international 
migration law would arrive stillborn.  Rather than launch a field of regulation 
governing the entry of individuals at sovereign borders, the bait and switch 
relegated the vast majority of the legal terrain to the sovereign right to exclude.  The 
remnants, now regarded as exceptions to the general rule of sovereign prerogative, 
were eventually given over to the new and exceptional field of refugee law. 
What I hope is coming into focus here is the interplay between two separate 
international law narratives that have yet to be properly understood together.  On 
one side is the “triumph” over a classic racial ideology, whereby the colonized 
world very slowly entered the field of newly independent states.  This is a story of 
the decline of a racialized right to exclude “inferior” peoples from the community 
of sovereign states.  On the other side is the transition from a moment in 
international law when migration between members of the Family of Nations was 
relaxed and relatively fluid, and ripe for the emergence of a new regime of 
international migration law, to a later moment in which the sovereign right to 
exclude manifests in the xenophobic context of a plenary power over border 
control.  This is the story of the ascendance of a racialized right to exclude 
“inferior” individuals from a sovereign’s national political community.  These two 
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narratives are deeply intertwined, in the sense that what we see here is the 
morphing of racial ideology in international law—what we have typically come 
to see as the eclipse of classic racial ideology—actually shifting into another 
disciplinary terrain.  This is the transformation from classic racial ideology into 
the modern: an entrenchment of a racialized right to exclude at the territorial 
border made possible by an emerging ideology of inclusion at the level of 
international society.  This dynamic would come to be governed by the 
antidiscrimination principle of human rights law: What once was called 
“racism” would become repackaged as “cultural diversity.” 
CONCLUSION 
The international law of the nineteenth century was in a pickle.  On one side, 
a traditional view of sovereignty had developed, as analogized to that famous 
resident of the “state of nature”: the rights-bearing individual of liberal political 
theory.  Just as that individual was born free and equal, naturally endowed with 
certain rights, so too were sovereign states free to determine their national destinies.  
The very idea of sovereignty entailed rights of equal autonomy and 
nonintervention for all.  On the other side, however, and after the end of the 
Napoleonic wars and the reconstitution of international society at the Congress 
of Vienna, the rights and powers of international legal personality were 
increasingly seen as belonging to certain, special peoples.  Given the traditional 
understanding of sovereignty, however, the question was about how to justifiably 
draw the line between those true sovereigns and the rest.  Indeed, by the second 
half of the nineteenth century, international lawyers increasingly needed legal 
justifications that warranted the exclusion of large portions of the world from the 
rights of sovereignty.  The problem was that within the confines of classic liberal 
theory, it was unclear how to make these kinds of distinctions.142 
This hierarchy of racial classification became the template for what 
international lawyers coined “the Family of Nations,” that community of states 
that were ostensibly free and equal in the exercise of the rights of international legal 
personality.  This use of racial classification as a legal justification for outlining the 
scope of the Family of Nations was integral to what I have called in this Article 
international law’s “classic racial ideology.”  In the American context of the 
Monroe Doctrine, I looked to the examples of Elihu Root and Alejandro Alvarez as 
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demonstrative of a racialized practice of argument in which certain human 
populations were considered ill-deserving of membership in the Family of Nations. 
Nevertheless, even as lawyers like Alvarez and Root comfortably deployed 
classic forms of racialized justification, what eventually seemed common ground 
was a view of global society as having matured beyond the problem of racism as 
any longer a fundamental feature of the international legal order.  International 
law’s race problem—congratulations all around—was largely solved.  The 
remaining fight would be engaged on the terrain of human rights law, and the 
elimination of individual acts of prejudice and discrimination.143 
This is the moment of a great feint, a moment of powerful misdirection that 
continues to cast a shadow on our own contemporary global order.  As classic 
racial ideology began to fade, the problem of racial exclusion looked to loosen as a 
problem for international law.  Soon, peoples once banished to the domain of 
colonies, mandates, and trusts would find their way as equals in the United 
Nations’s new world, where at least in the General Assembly, every people would 
enjoy a sovereign voice.  With the international community’s attention held by the 
gradual shift away from the Family of Nations and imperialism and toward the 
United Nations and decolonization, this focus on inclusion distracted away from 
an ideology of exclusion unfolding elsewhere.  The racial ideology of exclusion was 
still hard at work with a gatekeeping function, but no longer gatekeeping who 
could be a sovereign.  Distracted by the apparent sense in which a racialized right 
to exclude was feigning retreat at the level of a more inclusive United Nations, that 
very same ideology was manifesting a regime of highly exclusionary border 
controls.  That is, while at the level of the sovereign community racial ideology 
morphed into an ideology of inclusion, at the level of border control a new racial 
ideology was busily valorizing an ideology of exclusion. 
To restate the point: Racial ideology’s gatekeeping function in international 
law did not disappear in the transition from the Family of Nations to the United 
Nations, and in some ways, it even strengthened.  It was now working hard at the 
territorial border between states in a way that was entirely novel, even as the 
conceptual borderland between the Family of Nations and the uncivilized world 
was becoming more and more a story of economic development.144  The 
international legal presumption that a sovereign enjoyed a plenary right to exclude 
foreign individuals from its territory, in much the same way that an individual 
property owner could exclude the world, was coming into view for the first time. 
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And it came with a vengeance.  As has been thoroughly documented in the 
study of citizenship and immigration at the turn of the twentieth century, 
international law was increasingly relied on as a means for justifying the 
sovereign’s right to control the boundaries of its demos, as well as to determine 
the identity of its citizens.  The results, at least in the United States, were as racially 
marked as they were severe.  What’s more, this is also the moment of a racialized 
xenophobia rearing its head at the border.145  To be sure, xenophobia hardly 
comes into existence at the end of the nineteenth century.  Rather, the point is that 
as racial ideology morphed from its exclusionary work at the level of sovereigns 
and came to play a constitutive role in new thinking about border controls, “fear 
of the foreigner” took on a new and different significance, as well as justification, 
in international law. 
The aim of this Article has been to explore this shift from the classic to the 
modern mode of racial ideology in international law.  My claim is that until we 
can better understand what became of international law’s classic mode of racial 
ideology, and how it morphed into a modern structure, we will continue to see 
international law’s race problem as entirely marginal: a problem that does not 
really infect the discipline as much as it does individual agents.  Without this, we 
are at a disadvantage when it comes to studying the ideological legacy of the 
modern structure, and the status of international law’s race problem today. 
The discussion above intended to suggest how antiracist strategy in 
international law might have taken a route through the field of migration and 
border control.  Instead, a racialized right to exclude that had been raised to defend 
the frontiers of international society, has now been duplicated at the borders of 
national societies.  It was here that modern racial ideology justified a new form of 
racialized exclusion.  At the same time, modern racial ideology manifested a 
distinctly inclusive approach to global race relations.  But an important aspect of 
this architecture of inclusion was something beyond a mere willingness to open up 
international institutions to more participation.146  It was also the advent of human 
rights law, and in particular, the antidiscrimination principle.  This advent was 
bittersweet.  For just as “inclusion” was a desirable turn for international society 
with its own sorts of challenges, so too did the human rights approach both signal 
welcome developments and at the same time a closing down of alternative 
 
145. See, e.g., REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM (1981); KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600–2000 (2015); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE 
BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (2010). 
146. For discussion, see, for example, STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS (2014); SIMPSON, 
supra note 142. 
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approaches to racial justice. And it is this closing down that marks the arrival of a 
third structure—our contemporary structure of postracial ideology—the 
structure of raciality in which we find ourselves today. 
  
